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Abstract. It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, 
and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims 
has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is 
bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels 
like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of claims does not commit us 
to this subjectivist view. They are compatible with an objectivist view of pain’s badness, 
and with thinking that this badness is due to its phenomenal quality. Indeed, I argue 
that once the full range of options is in view, the most plausible account of pain is 
incompatible with subjectivism about value. 
 
There is a grand old question: do things have value, or give reasons for action, 
because we desire them, or do we desire them because they have value or give 
reasons?1 Call the first grand view subjectivism, the second objectivism. There is 
another old question: is pain bad because we dislike it or do we dislike it because 
it is bad? Many philosophers answer that pain is bad because we dislike it. Does 
that commit them to an answer to the grander question? It is clearer how the 
commitments go in the other direction. If we are already subjectivists, then we 
should say that pain is bad only because we desire it to stop. But if we say that 
pain is bad because disliked, should we endorse subjectivism, at least with 
respect to pain?  
In this paper I shall consider what follows from accepting what I shall call 
the Dislike Theory— the view that pain is bad only when disliked. I shall question 
the widespread assumption that this view supports a subjectivist view of pain’s 
badness—the view that pain is bad only because it is the object of desire. It is not 
just that the Dislike Theory is compatible with objectivism about value and 
reasons. This may not be enough, since there may still be a sense in which the 
Dislike Theory favours the subjectivist view. What I shall argue is that once the 
true range of available options is made clear, the Dislike Theory in its most 




Philosophers who hold a subjectivist view of pain typically hold a conjunction of 
claims. The first is  
The Dislike Theory. Whenever pain is intrinsically bad, it is also necessarily 
a state we dislike  
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The other is 
Contingency. The sensation of pain is only contingently disliked  
There are strong reasons to endorse both claims. It is often pointed out that there 
is no introspectible sensation common to all painful or unpleasant experiences. 
This suggests that it is not a specific sensation, but some further common state 
that is required to make all of these experiences bad. And the nature of that 
further state is suggested by the example of frontal lobotomy patients. These 
patients seem to feel the sensation of pain without disliking it at all. Most agree 
that whatever it is that such patients feel, it is not bad. So it seems that it is our 
dislike of pain that makes all the normative difference.2
  These considerations rely on our intuitions about particular cases. They do 
not directly draw on any grand meta-ethical view. It is easy, however, to see how 
this conjunction of claims would seem to support a subjectivist view of pain, the 
view that pain is bad, not just when but because it is disliked, where dislike is 
understood as a generic con-attitude:  
 (S) Pain is only bad because it is the object of a desire for it to stop 
To resist this conclusion, we could reject either one of the two conjuncts: 
(i) Most obviously, we could reject the Dislike Theory: we could try to 
argue both that pain is only contingently disliked and that it is still bad when not 
disliked. This is a natural way of arguing for what I shall call the Sensation 
Theory.3 On this view it is the sensation of pain that is intrinsically bad and 
whether it is disliked is both contingent and irrelevant. Since subjectivism is 
committed to the Dislike Theory, then this would be a straightforward way of 
resisting subjectivism.  
(ii) Another and generally overlooked way of arguing against a 
subjectivist account is to deny Contingency and claim both that pain is 
necessarily disliked and that, nevertheless, it is necessarily disliked only because it 
is bad in itself. Call this the Necessary Dislike Theory. It is understandable why this 
view has not been much discussed: it cannot rely on the most basic device for 
demonstrating intrinsic value, imagining something without a certain property it 
typically has (here, our dislike of pain) and asking whether it would still be 
intrinsically bad. But there is at least something to be said for the view. The 
necessary connection it assumes between pain qua bad and present-tense, first-
person motivation is parallel to the necessary connection that is often assumed to 
hold between pain qua sensation and present-tense, first-person belief.4 
Notice that the denial of Contingency—and thus this second alternative—
is compatible with the Dislike Theory, at least as stated above. So we may think 
of this alternative as one objectivist version of the Dislike Theory. But on this 
view pain is nevertheless disliked because it is bad.5  
In any case, each of the two alternatives depends on the denial of at least 
one of the two claims. But these are, to repeat, supported by persuasive 
considerations. What I want to ask in what follows is whether there is available a 
plausible objectivist view of pain’s badness if we do accept these two claims 




Let us assume then not only the Dislike Theory, but also the contingency of 
dislike. This does not leave room for the sensation of pain to be intrinsically bad. 
But we can still distinguish two ways of stating the resulting view of pain’s 
badness, one subjectivist, one objectivist: 
 (S) The sensation of pain is only bad because it is the object of a desire for 
it to stop 
 (O) The state that is intrinsically bad is not that of having a sensation of 
pain, but of having it and disliking it6 
To bring out the sense in which the second version is objectivist, it may be 
better to state these two views in terms of reasons. On the subjectivist reading, 
we have reasons to take the means to end our pain because we want it to stop. 
On the objectivist reading, the reasons we have are not to satisfy a desire, but 
rather to want to end the state we are in: the state of disliking our present pain. 
To be sure, on both readings someone in pain has reasons to try to end it. But 
they give distinct results as we move further. For one thing, the objectivist 
reading can explain why it is irrational to have a further desire to want one’s 
pain to continue. On the subjectivist view, this would be a desire that would 
compete on equal terms with our initial dislike of pain. The objectivist reading 
also automatically explains why we have reasons to avoid future pain, or care 
about past pain. On the subjectivist view, such rational concerns would be 
contingent on our having the appropriate motivation. The Dislike Theory 
ensures that we would dislike our present pain. It is entirely compatible with 
complete indifference to pain at all other times.7 
The distinction between (S) and (O) is not, of course, all that distinguishes 
objectivism and subjectivism, understood as grand meta-ethical views. 
Objectivists deny further that having positive or negative attitudes towards other 
kinds of objects, properties and states is sufficient for value accruing to (or 
reasons given by) the state of having such attitudes. While for subjectivists the 
fact that the object of our dislike is our present sensation of pain must be treated 
as of no special importance—the only thing that matters is the existence of a 
generic con-attitude—for the objectivist present sensations must be special.8 
If objectivists think of dislike as a generic con-attitude, then they are left in 
an uneasy position. They deny that either the sensation of pain or the having of a 
negative attitude towards something have any value on their own. It is only 
when these two indifferent things are combined that value and reasons are 
produced. How and why remains an unexplained mystery. Certainly there is 
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nothing in the objectivist position that predicts that one of the clearest cases of 
intrinsic value would turn out to involve a conative attitude that is itself not held 
for any reason. This surely counts against the objectivist reading of the Dislike 
Theory.9 Thus, even if the Dislike Theory is compatible with objectivism, it still 




There is one aspect of our ordinary conception of pain’s badness that the 
subjectivist reading of the Dislike Theory does not explain, indeed does not leave 
room for. It is extremely natural to think that pain’s badness is due to what it feels 
like, that pain is bad because it feels bad. We already saw one straightforward 
way of grounding pain’s badness in this way. That was the Sensation Theory, the 
view that the sensation of pain is bad whether or not we dislike it. The dispute 
between the Sensation Theory and Dislike Theory is an old one. But I believe that 
a common way of understanding what is at stake in it is mistaken. The two 
opposing views are 
 The Sensation Theory: the sensation of pain is intrinsically bad—its 
badness has nothing to do with whether or we dislike it or not 
 The Dislike Theory: whenever pain is intrinsically bad, it is also necessarily a 
state we dislike 
 Notice that these two claims may still be consistent if we held the overlooked 
view I called the Necessary Dislike Theory on which pain is necessarily disliked 
because it is bad. To exclude this objectivist reading of the Dislike Theory, we 
need to add to our statement of the Dislike Theory a further claim about 
evaluative priority—the claim that pain is bad because it is disliked. It is only this 
version of the Dislike Theory that is incompatible with the Sensation Theory.  
In any case, the sensation and dislike theories are almost invariably given 
a further gloss: 
 The Sensation Theory*: pain is bad only because of what it is like, because 
of how the sensation of pain intrinsically feels. 
The Dislike Theory*: pain is bad only because we want it to stop: its 
badness has nothing to do with how it intrinsically feels. 
 Although this gloss ensures that the two theories are incompatible, this way 
of setting out the dispute hides from view an important alternative.  
There is no problem with this statement of the Sensation Theory. Indeed, if 
the sensation of pain is intrinsically bad, then pain would be bad because of how 
the sensation of pain feels like. There is no other property that the sensation of 
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pain has that could explain its badness. But it does not follow, from the claim 
that pain is bad because it is disliked, that the badness of the state of disliking the 
sensation of pain has nothing to do with how this state intrinsically feels. And we 
saw that on the objectivist reading of the Dislike Theory, it is this state that is 
intrinsically bad, not the sensation of pain itself.  
At this point we must be careful to note two ways in which the term ‘pain’ 
can be used: to refer to a certain neutral sensation, or to the state of disliking such 
a sensation.10 In order to clearly mark this distinction, I shall henceforth use 
‘sensation of pain’ to refer exclusively to a particular type of sensation that, I 
shall assume, is in itself neither good or bad, while I shall speak of suffering when 
I want to refer to the larger state of disliking a sensation. 
I shall refer to the version of the Dislike Theory that denies that the 
badness of suffering has anything to with the character of our experience the Pure 
Dislike Theory. The alternative view I shall call the Experiential Dislike Theory. It is 
the conjunction of the following claims: 
(i) The Dislike Theory: when the sensation of pain is bad it is necessarily 
disliked;  
(ii) Evaluative priority of dislike: the sensation of pain is bad because it is 
disliked;  
(iii) Objectivism: the state that is intrinsically bad is not that of having a 
sensation of pain, but that of suffering—of having this sensation and 
disliking it;  
(iv) Experience: the state of disliking pain is intrinsically bad because of 
how it intrinsically feels.11 
 This variant of the Dislike Theory may seem to attribute suffering’s badness 
to two incompatible sources: to the presence of dislike (ii), and to its intrinsic feel 
(iv). But to think so is precisely to commit a common mistake about the relation 
between the Dislike Theory and what it is like to suffer. The mistake is to assume 
that to have an experience of a certain feel, and to have a sensation, are 
necessarily one and the same. But this is plainly false. To be sure, all sensations 
are also experiences. But many experiences are not sensations. Conscious 
thoughts are experiences. And very often, so are emotions and desires. States of 
emotion and desire, of course, need not always be felt. When they do make their 
mark in consciousness, what is experienced is a manifestation of an underlying 
dispositional state. This, however, is not a problem. On the Experiential Dislike 
Theory, what we refer to as dislike is necessarily felt. So there are no two sources 





What supports the Experiential Dislike Theory? It has one very significant 
advantage over the pure version. It is compatible with the natural view that pain 
is bad because of how it feels. This is how suffering is experienced. When 
philosophers argue that we must give up this natural view, they do so because 
they find the considerations that support the Dislike Theory persuasive, and 
because they assume that the natural view must be identical to the Sensation 
Theory. But we just saw that this natural view of pain’s badness is compatible 
with the Dislike Theory. And the intuition that supports the tie between pain’s 
badness and the way it feels to suffer is stronger and clearer than the 
considerations that support the Dislike Theory.  
We can argue for the experiential view by first considering a weaker 
claim: 
Supervenience: Suffering’s badness supervenes on the character of the 
agent’s total experiential state. 
On this view, there cannot be a change in whether an agent suffers or stops 
suffering without some change in his total experiential state. As I noted, this 
claim is weaker than the Experiential Dislike Theory. That facts about A 
supervene on facts about B doesn’t yet explain the metaphysical relation between 
the two. But the step from Supervenience to the Experiential Dislike Theory is 
very small indeed. If suffering necessarily supervened on the character of our 
experiential state, and given the strength of our intuition that suffering is bad 
because of how it feels like, then what else could explain suffering’s badness? 
To deny Supervenience is to hold that hedonic inversion is conceivable: that 
I could be in the same total experiential state I am in when suffering from 
excruciating pain, yet that this state may not be bad at all, or may even be 
intensely enjoyable and thus good. This, I believe, is not a suggestion we can 
make sense of. Perhaps there will be those who will deny this. But it is not by 
accident that, although subjectivism about pain’s badness is widespread, we are 
never told that this is one of its implications. Subjectivists must explicitly endorse 
this consequence. It will not do for them to hide behind the exotic reports of 
frontal lobotomy patients who only assert indifference to sensations of pain. And 
we have been given no reason to believe when lobotomy patients feel pain, their 
total experiential state is identical to ours when we suffer.  
It may be suggested that our impression that the badness of suffering is 
due to its phenomenal quality rather than to our bare desire to get rid of a 
sensation is the result of a kind of feedback effect. On this suggestion, our strong 
dislike of the sensation affects it in some way, but this change in its qualitative 
feel is entirely epiphenomenal and has nothing to do with its badness.13 The 
suggestion raises two questions. The first is simply, what does it mean? Talk of 
feedback is metaphorical. What we want to know is how the presence of desire 
can affect the quality of an experience, and why this happens in some cases and 
not others. Perhaps it will be replied that our understanding of conscious 
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experience is so poor that answers to such questions are simply not forthcoming. 
This will not do for a simple reason. We do not need any theory to recognise that 
felt emotions and desires are common denizens of ordinary conscious life—but 
these states do not make their presence in consciousness felt because of any 
feedback effect due to some further attitude. If so, why insist on the obscurities of 
experiential feedback? A second question is this. Talk of feedback suggests a 
merely causal, and thus contingent relation between dislike and quality of 
experience. But if so, then we must again be committed to the unlikely possibility 
of hedonic inversion. Yet if (mysteriously) the feedback effect is a necessary one, 
then it is no longer clear what could motivate the suggestion. Why should we 
hold that experience, of all things, is not as it appears to us? 
There is another difficulty with the Pure Dislike Theory. On both 
competing views, dislike is some kind of affective state with a conceptual tie to 
motivation. On the pure theory, however, dislike need not be any kind of 
experiential state (even if it sometimes may be felt). But this is inconsistent with 
the epistemology of suffering. As many proponents of the Dislike Theory 
recognise, that I suffer implies that I believe I am suffering, and that I believe I 
am suffering implies that I am indeed suffering, except perhaps in exceptional 
circumstances.14 Now on the experiential version, dislike has the epistemology of 
a conscious state. So it is clearly compatible with these two truisms. But on the 
pure version, dislike has the epistemology of an intentional state. And while we 
have first-person authority about our intentional states, it is widely recognised 
that this authority is fallible. We can be mistaken about our intentional states in a 
way we cannot be mistaken about our conscious states. So on the pure version 
we could suffer without knowing it, as well as mistakenly think we are suffering. 
But neither, I believe, is a genuine possibility. This is a further reason to reject the 
Pure Dislike Theory.  
Let me mention a final piece of evidence in support of the experiential 
view. Much of the case for the Dislike Theory rests on the example of lobotomy 
patients. But to put this much weight on an empirical result is to unwittingly 
become hostage to the vicissitudes of further research. Findings about the 
functional dissociation of two psychological phenomena are often followed by 
findings about a double dissociation between the two phenomena. This indeed 
may be the case with the sensation of pain and the affective state of dislike. 
Patients who underwent lobotomy report pain without dislike. Patients with 
another kind of brain lesion report dislike without pain. Such a patient reported 
a ‘clearly unpleasant’ feeling located ‘somewhere between fingertips and 
shoulder’ that he wanted to avoid, but was completely unable to further describe 
its quality, localization or intensity.15 Here we can either say that the sensation of 
pain is missing, or that the patient’s experience has no definite sensory qualities. 
But the unpleasantness is still experientially manifest, and known immediately. 
What this patient immediately feels is exactly what we’ve been calling dislike. 
And what he badly wants to end is this experiential state, not an indefinite 
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sensation. It is hard to see how either the pure Dislike Theory or the feedback 




Suffering, then, is essentially a phenomenal state, a state of consciousness. To ask 
us to define what that means would be asking too much. But it suffices to point 
out that the Experiential Dislike Theory doesn’t commit us to holding that there 
is a specific introspectible feel, akin to redness, that all unpleasant experiences 
share. A better analogy would be, not the phenomenal quality of redness, but 
that of being coloured. Particular shades of colour can be utterly different from 
one another, but this doesn’t prevent them from being instances of the same 
phenomenal type.17  
Although it is open to objectivists to deny that the experiential dimension 
of suffering plays any intrinsic normative role, this is not an attractive position to 
take. The Pure Dislike Theory may favour subjectivism; the Experiential Dislike 
Theory is incompatible with it. But I am not suggesting that objectivists should 
reject the Pure Dislike Theory just for this reason. It is the default view that what 
makes suffering bad is the way it feels. It is supported by a range of 
considerations and intuitions. If it is common to adopt the Pure Dislike Theory, 
this is not because this is an independently plausible position, but because the 
more plausible experiential version of the theory has been overlooked.18  
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